

Complexity of Multiagent BDI Logics with Restricted Modal Context

(Extended Abstract)

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we present and discuss a novel language restriction for modal logics for multiagent systems that can reduce the complexity of the satisfiability problem from EXPTIME-hard to NPTIME-complete. In the discussion we focus on a particular BDI logic, called TEAMLOG, which is a logic for modelling cooperating groups of agents and which possesses some of the characteristics typical to other BDI logics. All the technical results can be found in the dissertation [5].

Categories and Subject Descriptors

I.2.4 [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Knowledge Representation Formalisms and Methods—*Modal Logic*

General Terms

Theory

Keywords

Multiagent Theories, BDI, Teamwork, Modal Logic, Satisfiability

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the most influential models of agency is the *beliefs-desires-intentions (BDI) model* [2] and logical formalisms based on the BDI model [3, 10] are among the most important in the field of multiagent systems. One of the characteristics of these multimodal formalisms is adopting, along with standard modal systems K_n , KD_n or $KD45_n$, *mixed axioms* that interrelate modalities representing different aspects of agent description. Examples of such axioms are *realism axioms* [3, 10] and *introspection axioms* [4].

It is well known that the extension of these formalisms with fixpoint modalities representing group aspects of multiagent systems [9, 11, 1, 4] lead to EXPTIME-hardness of the satisfiability problem, even if modal depth of formulas is bounded by 2 [8, 7].

*Supported by the MNiSW grant N N206 399334.

Cite as: Complexity of Multiagent BDI Logics with Restricted Modal Context (Extended Abstract), Marcin Dziubiński, *Proc. of 10th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011)*, Tumer, Yolum, Sonenberg and Stone (eds.), May, 2–6, 2011, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 1171-1172.

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To deal with this problem we propose a new kind of language restriction called *modal context restriction*. In [6] we applied this restriction to standard systems of multimodal logics enriched with fix point modalities and showed that it leads to PSPACE-completeness and, when combined with modal depth restriction, to NPTIME-completeness of the satisfiability problem. In this paper we present modal context restrictions for BDI logics, choosing, as a ‘working’ formalism, TEAMLOG [4], a well known and important formalism that focuses on teamwork.

2. THE FORMALISM

TEAMLOG is a logical framework proposed to formalize individual and group aspects of BDI systems [4]. It is a multimodal formalism with the set of modal operators based on a non-empty and finite set of agents, \mathcal{A} : $\Omega^T = \Omega^{B^+} \cup \Omega^G \cup \Omega^{I^+}$, where $\Omega^{B^+} = \Omega^B \cup \{[B]_G^+ : G \in P(\mathcal{A}) \setminus \{\emptyset\}\}$, $\Omega^{I^+} = \Omega^I \cup \{[I]_G^+ : G \in P(\mathcal{A}) \setminus \{\emptyset\}\}$, $\Omega^B = \{[B]_j : j \in \mathcal{A}\}$, $\Omega^G = \{[G]_j : j \in \mathcal{A}\}$ and $\Omega^I = \{[I]_j : j \in \mathcal{A}\}$.¹ Operators $[B]_j$, $[G]_j$ and $[I]_j$ stand for beliefs, goals and intentions of agent j , respectively, while $[B]_G^+$ and $[I]_G^+$ are fixpoint modalities standing for common beliefs and mutual intentions of group G , respectively. The propositional multimodal language \mathcal{L}^T of TEAMLOG and its semantics are defined in the usual way (see [4] for details).

An important aspect of the formalism are mixed axioms, interrelating different attitudes of individual agents. The fact that for each agent j intentions are a subset of goals, is reflected in the **goals-intentions compatibility** axiom $[I]_j\varphi \rightarrow [G]_j\varphi$. The fact that each agent j is fully aware of his goals and intentions is reflected in **positive** and **negative introspection** axioms: $[O]_j\varphi \rightarrow [B]_j[O]_j\varphi$ and $\neg[O]_j\varphi \rightarrow [B]_j\neg[O]_j\varphi$, where $O \in \{G, I\}$.

As was shown in [7], the TEAMLOG satisfiability problem is EXPTIME-complete.

3. MODAL CONTEXT RESTRICTION

We start by defining the notion of modal context restriction for general language of multimodal logic. First we need a notion of modal context of a formula within a formula. Let \mathcal{L} be a multimodal language defined over some set of unary modal operators Ω .

¹ For the sake of conciseness we will use a more compact notation for operators of TEAMLOG, replacing that standard ones from [4].

Definition 1. Let $\{\varphi, \xi\} \subseteq \mathcal{L}$. The *modal context of formula ξ within formula φ* is a set of finite sequences over Ω , $\text{cont}(\xi, \varphi) \subseteq \Omega^*$, defined inductively as follows:

- $\text{cont}(\xi, \varphi) = \emptyset$, if $\xi \notin \text{Sub}(\varphi)$,
- $\text{cont}(\varphi, \varphi) = \{\varepsilon\}$,
- $\text{cont}(\xi, \neg\psi) = \text{cont}(\xi, \psi)$, if $\xi \neq \neg\psi$,
- $\text{cont}(\xi, \psi_1 \wedge \psi_2) = \text{cont}(\xi, \psi_1) \cup \text{cont}(\xi, \psi_2)$, if $\xi \neq \psi_1 \wedge \psi_2$,
- $\text{cont}(\xi, \Box\psi) = \Box \cdot \text{cont}(\xi, \psi_j)$, if $\xi \neq \Box\psi$ and $\Box \in \Omega$,

where $\text{Sub}(\varphi)$ denotes the set of all subformulas of φ and $\Box \cdot S = \{\Box \cdot s : s \in S\}$, for $\Box \in \Omega$ and $S \subseteq \Omega^*$.

Definition 2. A *modal context restriction* is a set of finite sequences over Ω , $R \subseteq \Omega^*$, constraining possible modal contexts of subformulas within formulas. We say that a formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}$ *satisfies a modal context restriction $R \subseteq \Omega^*$* iff for all $\xi \in \text{Sub}(\varphi)$ it holds that $\text{cont}(\xi, \varphi) \subseteq R$.

In this paper we propose two modal context restrictions of the language of TEAMLOG that lead to PSPACE completeness of the satisfiability problem. The restrictions are presented below.

Definition 3. Let

$$\mathbf{R}_1 = \Omega^* \setminus \left(\Omega^* \cdot \left[\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}) \setminus \{\emptyset\}} (S_I(G) \cup S_{IB}(G)) \cup \bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}), |G| \geq 2} S_B(G) \right] \cdot \Omega^* \right),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} S_{IB}(G) &= \bigcup_{j \in G} [I]_G^+ \cdot ([B]_j)^* \cdot T_B(\{j\}) \cdot T_I(\{j\}), \text{ and} \\ S_O(G) &= [O]_G^+ \cdot T_O(G), \\ T_O(G) &= \{[O]_j : j \in G\} \cup \{[O]_H^+ : H \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}), H \cap G \neq \emptyset\}, \end{aligned}$$

for $O \in \{B, I\}$. The set of formulas in \mathcal{L}^T satisfying restriction \mathbf{R}_1 will be denoted by $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$.

Definition 4. Let

$$\mathbf{R}_2 = \Omega^* \setminus \left(\Omega^* \cdot \left[\bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}) \setminus \{\emptyset\}} (S_I(G) \cup S_{IB}(G)) \cup \bigcup_{G \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}), |G| \geq 2} \tilde{S}_B(G) \right] \cdot \Omega^* \right),$$

where

$$\tilde{S}_B(G) = [B]_G^+ \cdot \left(\{[G]_j : j \in G\} \cup \bigcup_{O \in \{B, I\}} T_O(G) \right)$$

and S_{IB} , S_I and T_O , for $O \in \{B, I\}$, are defined like in the case of restriction \mathbf{R}_1 . The set of formulas in \mathcal{L}^T satisfying restriction \mathbf{R}_2 will be denoted by $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T$.

Restriction \mathbf{R}_1 forbids any operator $[O]_j$ or $[O]_H^+$, with $O \in \{B, I\}$ in the context of $[O]_G^+$, if $j \in G$ or $H \cap G \neq \emptyset$. Additionally the restriction forbids subsequences contained in S_{IB} . Forbidding subsequences from S_{IB} is related to axioms of positive and negative introspection of intentions. Restriction \mathbf{R}_2 is a refinement of restriction \mathbf{R}_1 which forbids any operator $[O]_j$ or $[O]_H^+$, with $O \in \{B, G, I\}$ in the context of $[B]_G^+$, if $j \in G$ or $H \cap G \neq \emptyset$. Thus any formula $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}^T$ satisfying restriction \mathbf{R}_2 , satisfies restriction \mathbf{R}_1 as well, that is $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T \subseteq \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$. Notice that if $|\mathcal{A}| = 1$, then $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T = \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$.

We have the following results regarding the complexity of the TEAMLOG satisfiability problems for formulas from $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T$.

THEOREM 1. *The TEAMLOG satisfiability problem for formulas from $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T$ is PSPACE-complete. Moreover, it is NPTIME-complete if model depth of formulas from $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_2}^T$ is bounded by a constant.*

THEOREM 2. *The TEAMLOG satisfiability problem for formulas from $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$ is PSPACE-complete, even if modal depth of formula is bounded by a constant ≥ 2 .*

It is worth noting that the second result was obtained despite the fact that formulas of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{R}_1}^T$ can enforce exponential path in the model.

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