ABSTRACT

Digital zero-sum games are a challenging domain for artificial intelligence techniques. In such games, human players often resort to strategies, i.e., memorized sequences of low-level actions that guide their behavior. In this research we model this way of playing by introducing the algorithm selection metagame, in which agents select algorithms to perform low-level game actions on their behalf.

The metagame provides a formal basis for algorithm selection in adversarial settings, presenting a simplified representation for complex games. We instantiate it upon real-time strategy game StarCraft, being able to discuss game-theoretic concepts in the resulting abstract representation, as well as generating a game-playing agent that successfully learns how to select algorithms in AI tournaments.

Keywords

Game Theory, Algorithm Selection, Digital Games

1. INTRODUCTION

Digital zero-sum games present great challenges for artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. Usually, they are real-time, have huge state spaces and simultaneous actions. Examples of such games include real-time strategy, racing, fighting, and practically all games where players compete. Usually, AI techniques have poor performance in such games. This contrasts with many traditional board and card games, which are either solved, or AI techniques achieve strong rational behavior, outperforming human players.

The goal of this research is to leverage the performance of AI techniques in digital zero-sum games. Our approach is inspired by human game-playing: instead of thinking on low-level game actions, skilled players usually have a portfolio of strategies, i.e., memorized sequences of actions that determine their behavior. During a game, they select appropriate strategies according to the situation. We mimic this approach by modeling game-playing as an algorithm selection problem [4]: an agent must map game states to algorithms that perform low-level actions on her behalf. To account for the presence of an opponent, we extend the algorithm selection framework - which has been successfully applied to complex problems (e.g. SAT [7]) - to adversarial settings. We do this by modeling algorithm selection as a zero-sum stochastic game, which we refer to as the algorithm selection metagame, illustrated in Figure 1.

The algorithm selection metagame is instantiated upon a complex zero-sum digital game, referred to as the underlying game. The set of metagame actions are the underlying game algorithms that players can choose. Metagame states are associated with portions of the underlying game’s state space (for example, the state space can be partitioned according to relevant features). In this methodology, the agent does not reason on low-level underlying game actions. Moreover, the agent does not worry with algorithm details: they can represent simple scripted behavior as well as complex game-playing programs (bots). Thus, the algorithm selection metagame provides a simplified, abstract layer of reasoning above a game.

If the metagame is simple enough, we can solve it, i.e., determine its Nash Equilibrium, with known learning and/or planning methods (e.g. minimax-Q [3]). The metagame solution specifies a policy for algorithm selection with theoretical guarantees on expected performance, regardless on the opponent’s algorithm selection policy.

The main advantage of our approach is that we obtain a tractable representation of a digital game, in which we can discuss important game theory concepts, although the theoretical guarantees in the metagame do not hold in the...
underlying game. However, this is a first step towards representations with less information loss, such that optimal performance in the metagame can result in strong performance in the underlying game.

2. CURRENT RESULTS

As a first experiment, we instantiated a special case of the metagame upon real-time strategy game StarCraft. The special case has a single state, i.e., each player maps only the initial game state to an algorithm that plays an entire match. This metagame corresponds to a normal-form game, whose payoff matrix indicates expected relative performance among algorithms. We estimated the payoff matrix with average results of matches among StarCraft bots which served as our algorithms.

We noticed that some algorithms interact in cyclical ways, similarly to rock-paper-scissors. In fact, our experiments confirmed insights of computer rock-paper-scissors tournaments [2]: it is useful to deviate from equilibrium to exploit sub-optimal opponents, but, against strong competitors, a player must protect itself against exploitation by playing the equilibrium strategy. These results are in [6].

We also built a functional StarCraft bot, named MegaBot, which uses the single-state metagame framework of [6], to participate in AI tournaments. MegaBot has a portfolio of three algorithms, which are themselves other StarCraft bots, specifically, three non-dominant bots of AIIDE 2015 tournament1, in order to test whether MegaBot performs well by learning how to properly select algorithms rather than due to a powerful portfolio. In StarCraft AI tournaments, we do not know the metagame payoff matrix beforehand, thus we learn its values via minimax-Q’s update rule.

MegaBot placed among the top 50% bots in two competitions. It has outperformed each of its portfolio components and received an honorable mention for its learning curve (measured in rate of victories per round). This indicates that the metagame is a useful approach for algorithm selection in adversarial settings. MegaBot did not score better because no component of its portfolio could defeat the strongest competitors.

3. NEXT STEPS

The presented metagame model assumes that players know each other’s algorithm portfolio. However, in a realistic setting, the agent is aware of the opponent’s presence but does not know his possible behaviors. Formally, the agent plays an incomplete-information stochastic game, in which it only knows its own actions. Next steps of this research involve the study of our proposed model for this situation: an extension of the adversarial multi-armed bandit [1] - which corresponds to a normal-form game with unknown opponent actions - to a multi-state problem. The Exp3 method of [1] replaces the usual equilibrium calculation in the single-state adversarial bandit, exhibiting theoretical performance guarantees. In our multi-state case, we extend Exp3 by incorporating the value of future states in action-values used for policy calculation, as in traditional reinforcement learning methods. To the best of our knowledge, both the model of stochastic games with incomplete information and the proposed method to handle it (named SG-Exp3, from Stochastic Game Exp3) are novel.

We want to investigate whether SG-Exp3 bounds agent’s losses, extending the guarantees of Exp3 from adversarial multi-armed bandits to stochastic games. Experimental results may be useful in this sense: a robust performance of SG-Exp3 may indicate that further investigation of its theoretical properties can be fruitful.

An interesting direction of research, possibly out of the current thesis’ scope, is metagame creation, that is, to automatically place decision points in relevant portions of the underlying game’s state space. Automatically created metagame might help mitigating a metagame limitation: it is a “lossy” abstraction of the underlying game so that its solution is not valid for the underlying game. In other words, it might be possible for a player to perform low-level underlying game actions to exploit a metagame player. In this sense, a long-term goal is to construct increasingly precise metagames, that remain simple to solve, but maintain the underlying game’s strategic structure, so that optimal metagame strategies result in strong underlying game performance. Moreover, this methodology would fit the leading game-solving paradigm used in poker [5], in which automatic abstractions are generated, solved and the resulting strategy is ported to the original game.

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REFERENCES


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