| Session | C1 |
| Title | Game Theory II |
| Chair | Maria Polukarov |
| 561 | The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design |
| Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre | |
| 224 | Computational Bundling for Auctions |
| Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm | |
| 784 | Mechanism Design for Daily Deals |
| Binyi Chen, Tao Qin, Tie-Yan Liu | |
| 739 | Selling Tomorrow's Bargains Today |
| Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid Mahini, David Malec, Aravind Srinivasan | |
| 805 | Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach |
| Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo | |
| 313 | Complexity of Mechanism Design with Signaling Costs |
| Andrew Kephart, Vincent Conitzer |