[2] J. Burke, D. Estrin, M. Hansen, A. Parker, and N. Rmanathan. Participatory sensing. In *World-Sensor-Web*, 2006.

[3] Y. Chen and D. M. Pennock. A utility framework for bounded-loss market makers. In *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2007)*, pages 49–56, 2007.

[4] D. Christin, A. Reinhardt, S. Kanhere, and M. Hollick. Combinatorial information market design. *The Journal of Systems and Software*, 84(11):1928–1946, 2011.

[5] R. N. Colvile, N. K. Woodfield, D. J. Carruthers, B. E. A. Fisher, A. Rickard, S. Neville, and A. Hughes. Uncertainty in dispersion modeling and urban air quality mapping. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 5:207–220, 2002.

[6] A. Dasgupta and A. Ghosh. Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous proficiency. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM International World Wide Web Conference (WWW'13)*, 2013.

[7] A. Dua, N. Bulusu, and W. Feng. Towards trustworthy participatory sensing. In *Proceedings of the 4th USENIX conference on Hot topics in security.*, 2009.

[8] B. Faltings, J. J. Li, and R. Jurca. Incentive mechanisms for community sensing. *IEEE Transaction on Computers*, 63:115–128, 2014.

[9] T. Gneiting and A. E. Raftery. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 102:359–378, 2007.

[10] R. D. Hanson. Combinatorial information market design. *Information Systems Frontiers*, 5(1):107–119, 2003.

[11] S.-W. Huang and W.-T. Fu. Enhancing reliability using peer consistency evaluation in human computation. In *Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Computer supported cooperative work*, 2013.

[12] R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Minimum payments that reward honest reputation feedback. In *Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'06)*, pages 190–199, 2006.

[13] R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Robust incentive-compatible feedback payments. In *Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce*, volume LNAI 4452, pages 204–218. Springer-Verlag, 2007.

[14] A. Krause, A. Singh, and C. Guestrin. Combinatorial information market design. *The Journal of Machine Learning Research*, 9:235–284, 2008.

[15] N. Miller, P. Resnick, and R. Zeckhauser. Eliciting informative feedback: The peer-prediction method. *Management Science*, 51:1359–1373, 2005.

[16] D. Prelec. A bayesian truth serum for subjective data. *Science*, 34(5695):462–466, 2004.

[17] D. Prelec and S. Seung. An algorithm that finds truth even if most people are wrong. Working paper, 2006.

[18] G. Radanovic and B. Faltings. A robust bayesian truth serum for non-binary signals. In *Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'13)*, 2013.

[19] G. Radanovic and B. Faltings. Incentives for truthful information elicitation of continuous signals. In *Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'14)*, 2014.

[20] B. Riley. Minimum truth serums with optional predictions. In *Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (SC14)*, 2014.

[21] L. J. Savage. Elicitation of personal probabilities and expectations. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 66(336):783–801, 1971.

[22] A. Singla and A. Krause. Incentives for privacy tradeoff in community sensing. In *Proceedings of HCOMP*, 2013.

[23] B. Waggoner and Y. Chen. Information elicitation sans verification. In *Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Social Computing and User Generated Content (SC'13)*, 2013.

[24] B. Waggoner and Y. Chen. Output agreement mechanisms and common knowledge. In *Proceedings of the 2nd AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP)*, 2014.

[25] J. Witkowski and D. C. Parkes. Peer prediction without a common prior. In *Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC' 12)*, pages 964–981, 2012.

[26] J. Witkowski and D. C. Parkes. A robust bayesian truth serum for small populations. In *Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'12)*, 2012.

[27] P. Zhang and Y. Chen. Elicitability and knowledge-free elicitation with peer prediction. In *Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (AAMAS '14)*, 2014.