

than half of the total number of votes are in its favor. Formally, $EMaj(\Gamma)_j = 1$ iff $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} (\sum_{v \in \text{Mod}(\gamma_i)} \frac{v(j)}{|\text{Mod}(\gamma_i)|}) \geq \lceil \frac{n+1}{2} \rceil$. To guarantee equality among agents submitting formulas having a varying number of models, $EMaj$ weights each model of an agent's goal inversely proportional to the total number of models of her goal.

Secondly, $TrueMaj$ compares the total acceptances with the total rejections for an issue, setting the result to 1 (respectively, 0) if it is higher (respectively, lower) and to both 0 and 1 when tied. Formally, $TrueMaj(\Gamma) = \prod_{j \in \mathcal{I}} M(\Gamma)_j$ where for all $j \in \mathcal{I}$:

$$M(\Gamma)_j = \begin{cases} \{x\} & \text{if } \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \frac{m_{ij}^x}{|\text{Mod}(\gamma_i)|} > \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \frac{m_{ij}^{1-x}}{|\text{Mod}(\gamma_i)|} \\ \{0, 1\} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

As with $EMaj$, the models of an individual goal are weighted inversely to the total number of models for that goal.

Finally, $2sMaj$ first applies majority to the models of the agents' individual goals, and then again to the result of the first step of aggregation, i.e., $2sMaj(\Gamma) = Maj(Maj(\text{Mod}(\gamma_1)), \dots, Maj(\text{Mod}(\gamma_n)))$.

3 MANIPULATION OF MAJORITY RULES

The induced preference relation on the alternatives is dichotomous: agents equally prefer any model of their goal to any counter-model. As for irresolute rules the outcome may be a set of interpretations, different notions of satisfaction could be defined depending on how an agent compares two sets of interpretations.

Let $sat : \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{I}} \times (\mathcal{P}(\{0, 1\}^m) \setminus \emptyset) \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be a function expressing the satisfaction of agent i towards the outcome of a rule F on profile Γ . To simplify, we write $sat(i, F(\Gamma))$ instead of $sat(\gamma_i, F(\Gamma))$. The preference of agent i over outcomes is then defined as a complete and transitive relation \preceq_i , whose strict part is $<_i$, such that $F(\Gamma) \preceq_i F(\Gamma')$ iff $sat(i, F(\Gamma)) \geq sat(i, F(\Gamma'))$.

For $\Gamma = (\gamma_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}$, let $(\Gamma_{-i}, \gamma'_i) = \Gamma' = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma'_i, \dots, \gamma_n)$ be the profile where only agent i changed her goal from γ_i to γ'_i . Agent i has an incentive to manipulate by submitting goal γ'_i in place of goal γ_i if and only if $F(\Gamma_{-i}, \gamma'_i) <_i F(\Gamma)$. A rule F is *strategy-proof* if and only if for all profiles Γ there is no agent i who has an incentive to manipulate.

Everaere et al. [9] propose three manipulation strategies an agent i may perform depending on how much they are allowed to deviate from their truthful goal: *unrestricted* when i can send any γ'_i instead of her truthful γ_i , *erosion* when i can only send a γ'_i such that $\text{Mod}(\gamma'_i) \subseteq \text{Mod}(\gamma_i)$ and *dilatation* when i can send only a γ'_i such that $\text{Mod}(\gamma_i) \subseteq \text{Mod}(\gamma'_i)$. If a rule can be manipulated by erosion or dilatation it is manipulable in the general case, while if it is strategy-proof for unrestricted manipulation it is also strategy-proof for erosion and dilatation.

The issue-wise majority rule is known to be strategy-proof in the context of judgment aggregation [3], while this is not true anymore when moving to propositional goals:

THEOREM 3.1. *EMaj, TrueMaj and 2sMaj can be manipulated by both erosion and dilatation.*

Since strategy-proofness cannot be guaranteed in general, we study the manipulability of the proposed rules when the agents'

	\mathcal{L}^\wedge		\mathcal{L}^\vee		\mathcal{L}^\oplus	
	E	D	E	D	E	D
<i>EMaj</i>	SP	SP	M	SP	M	M
<i>TrueMaj</i>	SP	SP	M	SP	M	M
<i>2sMaj</i>	SP	SP	SP	SP	M	M

Table 1: *E* stands for erosion, *D* for dilatation, *SP* for strategy-proof and *M* for manipulable.

goals are restricted to conjunctions (corresponding to the framework of judgment aggregation with abstentions [4, 5]), disjunctions or exclusive disjunctions. Our results are summarized in Table 1.

4 COMPLEXITY OF MANIPULATION

We also study how computationally difficult would it be for an agent to find a goal allowing them to get a better outcome for the rules $EMaj$ and $2sMaj$. The formal definition of the $\text{MANIP}(F)$ problem is in line with analogous work in judgment aggregation [8]: the input is a profile Γ and an agent i , and the question is whether there is a γ'_i such that $F(\Gamma_{-i}, \gamma'_i) <_i F(\Gamma)$. Let PP , for Probabilistic Polynomial Time, be the class of problems that can be solved in nondeterministic polynomial time with acceptance condition that more than half of the computations accept. We show that:

THEOREM 4.1. *MANIP(2sMaj) and MANIP(EMaj) are PP-hard.*

5 RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSIONS

The literature on combinatorial voting (see, e.g., the chapter by Lang and Xia [16]) provides solutions to tackle the combinatorial explosion entailed by the structure of the alternatives, such as voting sequentially over issues using tractable voting rules. The work of Lang [15] on voting in multi-issue domains with compactly represented preferences is the starting point of our considerations. Propositional goals are perhaps the simplest compact language for preferences, linked to the literature on social choice with dichotomous preferences [6, 7]. The framework of belief merging [13, 14], also studies the aggregation of propositional formulas, focusing on aggregators satisfying a set of desirable properties inspired from belief revision. Closely related work is the study of strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation [3, 8], where the input is a complete binary choice over all issues rather than a propositional goal, as well as in belief merging [9]. Manipulation of voting rules has been amply studied in voting theory, starting from the seminal result of Gibbard and Satterthwaite [10, 19] to more recent studies aimed at finding barriers to manipulation (see, e.g., the survey by Conitzer and Walsh [1]). Propositional goals in a strategic setting have been extensively studied in the literature on boolean games [12, 21]. Here, however, issues are not exclusively controlled by agents, a closer model being that of aggregation games [11].

In this paper we studied the strategic component of the recent framework of goal-based voting for three variants of issue-wise majority [18]. We find that $EMaj$, $TrueMaj$ and $2sMaj$ are manipulable, even for erosion and dilatation strategies. As positive results, an agent with a goal in the language of conjunctions cannot manipulate, and for disjunctions $TrueMaj$ and $EMaj$ are only manipulable by erosion. While not strategy-proof in general, these resolute majority rules are PP-hard for an agent to manipulate.

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