



















## REFERENCES

- [1] J. Bartholdi, III and M. Trick. 1986. Stable Matching with Preferences Derived from a Psychological Model. *Operations Research Letters* 5, 4 (1986), 165–169.
- [2] D. Baumeister, T. Hogrebe, and L. Rey. 2019. Generalized Distance Bribery. In *Proceedings of AAAI-2019*. 1764–1771.
- [3] D. Black. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge University Press.
- [4] F. Brandt, M. Brill, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. 2015. Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research* 53 (2015), 439–496.
- [5] R. Bredereck, J. Chen, P. Faliszewski, A. Nichterlein, and R. Niedermeier. 2016. Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery. *Information and Computation* 251 (2016), 140–164.
- [6] R. Bredereck, J. Chen, and G. Woeginger. 2013. A Characterization of the Single-Crossing Domain. *Social Choice and Welfare* 41, 4 (2013), 989–998.
- [7] L. Chen, L. Xu, S. Xu, Z. Gao, N. Shah, Y. Lu, and W. Shi. 2018. Protecting Election from Bribery: New Approach and Computational Complexity Characterization. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2018*. 1894–1896.
- [8] J. Doignon and J. Falmagne. 1994. A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations. *Journal of Algorithms* 16, 2 (1994), 218–233.
- [9] B. Dorn and I. Schlotter. 2012. Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Swap Bribery. *Algorithmica* 64, 1 (2012), 126–151.
- [10] E. Elkind and P. Faliszewski. 2010. Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management. In *Proceedings of WINE-2010*. Springer-Verlag *Lecture Notes in Computer Science* #6484, 473–482.
- [11] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and P. Skowron. 2020. A Characterization of the Single-Peaked Single-Crossing Domain. *Social Choice and Welfare* 54, 1 (2020), 167–187.
- [12] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. 2009. Swap Bribery. In *Proceedings of SAGT-2009*. Springer-Verlag *Lecture Notes in Computer Science* #5814, 299–310.
- [13] E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. 2012. Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences. In *Proceedings of ACM EC-2012*. 496–513.
- [14] J. Enelow and M. Hinich. 1984. *The spatial theory of voting: An introduction*. Cambridge University Press.
- [15] B. Escoffier, J. Lang, and M. Öztürk. 2008. Single-Peaked Consistency and its Complexity. In *Proceedings of ECAI-2008*. 366–370.
- [16] P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and L. Hemaspaandra. 2009. How Hard is Bribery in Elections? *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research* 35 (2009), 485–532.
- [17] P. Faliszewski, P. Manurangsi, and K. Sornat. 2019. Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery. In *Proceedings of AAAI-2019*. 1901–1908.
- [18] P. Faliszewski and J. Rothe. 2016. Control and Bribery in Voting. In *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*, F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7.
- [19] P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, and N. Talmon. 2017. Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2017*. 6–14.
- [20] A. Kaczmarczyk and P. Faliszewski. 2019. Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery. *Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems* 33, 3 (2019), 275–297.
- [21] D. Knop, M. Koutecký, and M. Mnich. 2017. Voting and Bribing in Single-Exponential Time. In *Proceedings of STACS-2017*. 46:1–46:14.
- [22] F. Lakhani, D. Peters, and E. Elkind. 2019. Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles. In *Proceedings of IJCAI-2019*. 414–420.
- [23] T. Magrino, R. Rivest, E. Shen, and D. Wagner. 2011. Computing the Margin of Victory in IRV Elections. (Aug. 2011). Presented at 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections.
- [24] C. Maushagen, M. Neveling, J. Rothe, and A.-K. Selker. 2018. Complexity of Shift Bribery in Iterative Elections. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2018*. 1567–1575.
- [25] J. Mirrlees. 1971. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation. *Review of Economic Studies* 38 (1971), 175–208.
- [26] S. Obraztsova and E. Elkind. 2011. On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation under Randomized Tie-Breaking. In *Proceedings of IJCAI-2011*. 319–324.
- [27] S. Obraztsova, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, and A. Slinko. 2013. On Swap-Distance Geometry of Voting Rules. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2013*. 383–390.
- [28] S. Obraztsova, E. Elkind, and N. Hazan. 2011. Ties Matter: Complexity of Voting Manipulation Revisited. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2011*. 71–78.
- [29] K. Roberts. 1977. Voting over income tax schedules. *Journal of Public Economics* 8, 3 (1977), 329–340.
- [30] I. Schlotter, P. Faliszewski, and E. Elkind. 2017. Campaign Management Under Approval-Driven Voting Rules. *Algorithmica* 77, 1 (2017), 84–115.
- [31] D. Shiryaev, L. Yu, and E. Elkind. 2013. On Elections with Robust Winners. In *Proceedings of AAMAS-2013*. 415–422.
- [32] L. Xia. 2012. Computing the Margin of Victory for Various Voting Rules. In *Proceedings of ACM EC-2012*. 982–999.
- [33] W. Zwicker. 2016. Introduction to the Theory of Voting. In *Handbook of Computational Social Choice*, F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.