



















## REFERENCES

- [1] K. J. Arrow. 1951. *Social choice and individual values*. John Wiley and Sons.
- [2] H. Aziz, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, and P. Skowron. 2017. The Condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: From shortlisting to proportionality. In *IJCAI* 84–90.
- [3] H. Aziz, B. E. Lee, and N. Talmon. 2018. Proportionally representative participatory budgeting: axioms and algorithms. In *AAMAS*. 23–31.
- [4] G. Benade, S. Nath, A. D. Procaccia, and N. Shah. 2017. Preference elicitation for participatory budgeting. In *AAAI*. 376–382.
- [5] N. Betzler, A. Slinko, and J. Uhlmann. 2013. On the computation of fully proportional representation. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research* 47 (2013), 475–519.
- [6] D. Black. 1948. On the rationale of group decision-making. *The Journal of Political Economy* 56, 1 (1948), 23–34.
- [7] S. J. Brams, D. M. Kilgour, and M. R. Sanver. 2007. A minimax procedure for electing committees. *Public Choice* 132 (2007), 401–420.
- [8] M. Brill and V. Conitzer. 2015. Strategic voting and strategic candidacy. In *AAAI*. 819–826.
- [9] M. Brill, R. Freeman, S. Janson, and M. Lackner. 2017. Phragmén’s voting methods and justified representation. In *AAAI*. 406–413.
- [10] B. Chamberlin and P. Courant. 1983. Representative deliberations and representative decisions: Proportional representation and the Borda rule. *American Political Science Review* 77, 3 (1983), 718–733.
- [11] B. Dutta, M. L. Breton, and M. O. Jackson. 2001. Strategic candidacy and voting procedures. *Econometrica* 69 (2001), 1013–1037.
- [12] B. Dutta, M. L. Breton, and M. O. Jackson. 2002. Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy in committees. *Journal of Economic Theory* 103 (2002), 190–218.
- [13] L. Ehlers and J. A. Weymark. 2003. Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice. *Economic Theory* 22, 2 (2003), 233–243.
- [14] E. Elkind and M. Lackner. 2015. Structure in dichotomous preferences. In *IJCAI*. 2019–2025.
- [15] E. Elkind, M. Lackner, and D. Peters. 2017. Structured preferences. In *Trends in Computational Social Choice*, U. Endriss (Ed.). AI Access, Chapter 10, 187–207.
- [16] E. Elkind, J. Lang, and A. Saffidine. 2015. Condorcet winning sets. *Social Choice and Welfare* 44, 3 (2015), 493–517.
- [17] H. Eraslan and A. McLennan. 2004. Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures. *Journal of Economic Theory* 117, 1 (2004), 29–54.
- [18] P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, and N. Talmon. 2018. Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives. *Social Choice and Welfare* 51, 3 (2018), 513–550.
- [19] P. C. Fishburn. 1981. Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees. *SIAM J. Appl. Math.* 41, 3 (1981), 499–502.
- [20] W. V. Gehrlein. 1985. The Condorcet criterion and committee selection. *Mathematical Social Sciences* 10, 3 (1985), 199–209.
- [21] J. Kruger and S. Schneckenburger. 2019. Fall if it lifts your teammate: a novel type of candidate manipulation. In *AAMAS*. 1431–1439.
- [22] J. Lang, N. Maudet, and M. Polukarov. 2013. New results on equilibria in strategic candidacy. In *SAGT’15*. 13–25.
- [23] T. Lu and C. Boutilier. 2011. Budgeted social choice: from consensus to personalized decision making. In *IJCAI*. 280–286.
- [24] T. Lu and C. Boutilier. 2015. Value-directed compression of large-scale assignment problems. In *AAAI*. 1182–1190.
- [25] H. Moulin. 1980. On strategy-proofness and single peakedness. *Public Choice* 35 (1980), 437–455.
- [26] H. Moulin. 1991. *Axioms of cooperative decision making*. Cambridge University Press.
- [27] S. Obraztsova, E. Elkind, M. Polukarov, and Z. Rabinovich. 2015. Strategic candidacy games with lazy candidates. In *IJCAI*. 610–616.
- [28] M. Polukarov, S. Obraztsova, Z. Rabinovich, A. Kruglyi, and N. R. Jennings. 2015. Convergence to equilibria in strategic candidacy. In *IJCAI*. 624–630.
- [29] T. C. Ratliff. 2003. Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees. *Social Choice and Welfare* 21, 3 (2003), 433–454.
- [30] C. Rodriguez-Alvarez. 2006. Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures. *Economic Theory* 27, 3 (2006), 657–677.
- [31] C. Rodriguez-Alvarez. 2006. Candidate stability and voting correspondences. *Social Choice and Welfare* 27, 3 (2006), 545–570.
- [32] P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, and J. Lang. 2016. Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation. *Artificial Intelligence* 241 (2016), 191–216.
- [33] P. Skowron, L. Yu, P. Faliszewski, and E. Elkind. 2015. The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates. *Theoretical Computer Science* 569 (2015), 43–57.
- [34] B. Smeulders. 2018. Testing a mixture model of single-peaked preferences. *Mathematical Social Sciences* 93 (2018), 101–113.
- [35] T. N. Thiele. 1895. Om flerfoldsvalg. In *Oversigt over det kongelige danske videnskabernes selskabs forhandlinger*. København, 415–441.