No-regret Learning Dynamics for Sequential Correlated Equilibria

Extended Abstract

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ABSTRACT

While no-regret learning procedures that converge to correlated equilibria have long been known to exist for normal form games, their analogue in sequential games remains less clear. We propose the sequential correlated equilibrium, a solution concept that extends the correlated equilibrium to sequential games while also guaranteeing sequential rationality even for mediator recommendations off the path of play. Additionally, we show that any internal regret minimization procedure designed for normal-form games can be efficiently extended to sequential games and use this to design no-regret learning dynamics that converge to the set of sequential correlated equilibria.

KEYWORDS

internal regret; counterfactual regret minimization; sequential games; correlated equilibria; sequential rationality

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1 INTRODUCTION

Algorithmic game theory aims to discover simple, efficient algorithms that converge to equilibria. One popular family of such algorithms is no-regret learning dynamics, whereupon players play a game repeatedly and choose their future actions using a simple learning procedure over their past results. A celebrated result in computational game theory is that no-regret learning dynamics lead to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games if each player chooses their future strategies with probabilities proportional to their regret for not choosing that strategy in the past [2]. More recently, this result was extended for correlated equilibria in general normal-form games [3, 11, 12].

This paper asks whether we can achieve similar results in sequential games. One recent successful approach in this direction has been counterfactual regret minimization [20], which converges to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum sequential games of perfect recall. Counterfactual regret minimization uses a tree decomposition approach to break up the original game into a number of “minigames,” each of which can be efficiently optimized independently with an external regret minimization algorithm. Counterfactual regret minimization has led to significant successes in computational game theory, such as building agents which have surpassed humans in several popular forms of poker [4–6, 16].

These recent successes in two-player zero-sum games have led to increased interest in learning in general games with more than two-players and with non zero-sum utility functions. Since computing a Nash equilibrium is known to be computationally hard in such cases [8, 9, 18], focus has been turned to alternative solution concepts such as the correlated equilibrium [1] and the extensive-form correlated equilibrium [19]. Directly extending counterfactual regret minimization to converge to the set of correlated equilibria in general sequential games runs into the hurdle of having to satisfy an exponentially large number of incentive constraints. Several extensions of the correlated equilibrium, such as the extensive-form correlated equilibrium [19] or the autonomous correlated equilibrium [10] have been proposed and are known to be tractably computable in sequential games [14]. However, these equilibria do not typically guarantee any form of sequential rationality [15], in that they may require players to play suboptimally after departing from the equilibrium path. This paper has two main contributions. First, we propose a novel solution concept called the sequential correlated equilibrium. Second, we describe S-CFR, a no-regret learning procedure that converges to the set of sequential correlated equilibria.
2 EQUILIBRIA IN SEQUENTIAL GAMES

For space reasons, we relegate a detailed discussion of the notation and no regret learning procedure to the full paper and merely describe the proposed solution concepts in the extended abstract.

2.1 Forgiving Correlated Equilibria

Before formally defining sequential correlated equilibria, we will define an additional solution concept which will be useful to describe the sequential correlated equilibrium and the learning dynamics that converge to it. A forgiving correlated equilibrium is similar to an extensive-form correlated equilibrium except that the mediator will “forgive” player errors. That is, in a forgiving correlated equilibrium, mediator recommendations continue to be given to each player even after they deviate from previous recommendations. Furthermore, these recommendations will continue to be incentive compatible. Thus, it will never be in a player’s interest to deviate from a mediator recommendation, even if that player has already done so at a previous point in the game. Formally, we can define the forgiving correlated equilibrium as follows:

**Definition 2.1.** Let \( h \) be a probability distribution over strategy profiles. A signal \( h \) forms a forgiving correlated equilibrium if it satisfies:

\[
\max_{I \in I} \max_{\tilde{a} \in \tilde{A}(I)} \sum_{s \in \Sigma} h(s) O(I, \tilde{a}, s)(u(I, d, s) - u(I, s)) \leq 0.
\]

2.2 Sequential Correlated Equilibrium

Inspired by the sequential equilibrium [15], which addresses this issue for Nash equilibria in sequential games, we propose the sequential correlated equilibrium. The sequential correlated equilibrium is a computationally-tractable extension of the correlated equilibrium solution concept to sequential games that includes guarantees of sequential rationality at all infosets in the game, not merely those that are on the path of play. Say a probability distribution \( h \) has full support if it places positive probability on every pure strategy profile \( s \in \Sigma \). Define a belief \( \beta \) that corresponds to a signal \( h \) with full support as

\[
\beta^h(s | I, \tilde{a}) = \frac{h(s) O(I, \tilde{a}, s)}{\sum_{s \in \Sigma} h(s) O(I, \tilde{a}, s)}.
\]

Alongside [7], which was completed concurrently and independently of our work, this paper provides the first extension of no internal regret learning dynamics to sequential games.

### Table 1: A comparison of the computability and sequential rationality properties of various equilibria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equilibrium</th>
<th>Complexity in Normal-form Games</th>
<th>Complexity in Sequential Games</th>
<th>Guarantees Sequential Rationality?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sequential Correlated (ours)</strong></td>
<td>Polynomial</td>
<td>Polynomial</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These are the Bayes consistent beliefs over the strategy profile describing the mediator’s recommendations, conditional on arriving at an infoset \( I \) and receiving a signal history \( \tilde{a} \).

**Definition 2.2.** Let \( (h_n)_n \) be a sequence of signals, all of which have full support, that converge to some signal \( h^* \) (not necessarily full support). Let \( \beta^n \) be the corresponding Bayes updated beliefs to the signal \( h_n \) as defined above and let \( \beta^* = \lim_{n \to \infty} \beta^n \). \((h^*, \beta^*, (h_n)_n)\) forms a sequential correlated equilibrium if it satisfies

\[
\max_{I \in I} \max_{\tilde{a} \in \tilde{A}(I)} \sum_{s \in \Sigma} \beta^*(s | I, \tilde{a}) (u(I, d, s) - u(I, s)) \leq 0.
\]

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the forgiving correlated equilibrium, the extensive-form correlated equilibrium, the canonical correlated equilibrium, the Nash equilibrium, and the sequential forgiving correlated equilibrium described in Section 2.2. Sequential correlated equilibria are the limit points of a sequence of forgiving correlated equilibria with full support (see Section 2.2), along with their corresponding beliefs. This observation will form the backbone of our construction of no-regret learning dynamics that converge to sequential correlated equilibria.

3 RELATED WORK

3.1 Equilibria

We extensively discuss the relationship between sequential correlated equilibria and other equilibria in Section 3 of our full paper and give only a brief summary here. The Nash equilibrium is the most well-known solution concept in game theory, but is computationally hard to compute [8, 9]. Its leading competitor, the correlated equilibrium, is computationally feasible in normal-form games [13] but not in sequential games. The extensive-form correlated equilibrium is a tractable extension of the correlated equilibrium to sequential games [14, 19], but does not come with guarantees of sequential rationality. The sequential equilibrium [15] guarantees sequential rationality, but as it is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, it is also computationally hard to compute.

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REFERENCES


